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An important aspect in determining the effectiveness of gift exchange relations in labor 
markets is the ability of the worker to “repay the gift” to the employer. To test this hypothesis, 
we conduct a real effort laboratory experiment where we vary the wage and the effect of the 
worker’s effort on the manager’s payoff. Furthermore we collect additional information that 
allows us to control for the workers’ ability and whether they can be classified as reciprocal or 
not. From our agency model of reciprocal motivation we derive non-trivial predictions about 
which is the marginal worker (in terms of ability) affected by our experimental variation and 
how different types of individuals, selfish and reciprocal, will react to it. Our model does 
substantially better than other theories in organizing the data. 
JEL-Code: C91, J33, M52. 






Department of Economics 
University of Munich 





University of Michigan 
Ross School of Business 
701 Tappan Street R4486 







February 1, 2010 
We thank Greg Baron, Al Roth, Carmit Segal, and Christina Strassmair for very helpful 
discussions and the participants of the Tinbergen Institute conference ’Human Relations, 
Reciprocity, and Incentives in the Workplace’ 2008 in Rotterdam, the ESEM 2009 in 
Barcelona, and the GEABA Conference 2009 in Vallendar for their comments. Florian 
Englmaier thanks the Harvard Business School for its hospitality and the German Science 
Foundation (DFG) for financial support via grant EN 784/2-1 and SFB/TR-15. Steve Leider 
thanks the National Science Foundation and the Sperry Fund for financial support. 1 Introduction
The common use of compensation schemes with weak monetary incentives (and the ability
of such schemes to induce employee eﬀort) has long been a puzzle in economics. Starting
with Akerlof (1982) a literature has developed that considers alternative sources of incen-
tives in the workplace. Akerlof models the labor relation as a gift exchange where workers
respond to generous treatment by the ﬁrm (i.e. generous wage levels) by exerting above
minimal eﬀort. Many laboratory experiments have corroborated the power of gift exchange
as a source, see Fehr and Falk (2008) for a survey. However, it is important to understand
what determines how well motivating workers via gift exchange works and how it can be
made more eﬀective.1 We argue that a key determinant of the eﬃcacy of using reciprocal
motivation to provide incentives is the ability of a worker to repay a gift, i.e. the magni-
tude of the beneﬁt accruing to the manager from high eﬀort by the worker. If eﬀort by the
worker provides little to no beneﬁt to the manager, then even a highly reciprocal worker
given a very generous wage may not provide much eﬀort.
We test this hypothesis in the lab using a real eﬀort task where we manipulate the extent
to which the manager beneﬁts from worker eﬀort. In our experiment subjects in the role
of the “manager” could hire subjects in the role of the “worker” to perform a coding task,
where workers have to match as many words to a speciﬁc code as possible in a pre-speciﬁed
time period of 25 minutes, for a ﬁxed wage payment of $10. The manager’s pay depended
on the number of correct answers by the workers (guessing was discouraged with a penalty).
We exogenously varied how much one correct answer was worth to the manager, and we
gave the managers the option to oﬀer the workers a higher ﬂat wage ($20) than the one
publicly announced at the beginning of the experiment. Thus we vary both the size of
the initial wage gift and the eﬀect of worker eﬀort on the manager’s payoﬀ. In the next
part of the experiment, all agents had to complete the coding task for ﬁve minutes under a
piece rate for correct answers (again, guessing was discouraged with a penalty). We use the
score from this test as a measure of individual ability. In addition, the subjects played a
standard trust game, which we use to classify them as reciprocal or not, and ﬁll out a “Big
5” personality test which we use to classify their personality type. We use this additional
information to more precisely estimate the impact of a wage gift.
1An example for work in this vein is Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2005) who investigate the impact of trans-
parency on the eﬀectiveness of gift exchange.
1It is intuitive to argue that there should be a complementarity between initial gift and the
ability to give back. Considering a simple agency model with reciprocal motivation, we can
derive nuanced predictions on the sets of agents aﬀected by the treatment variations which
other competing theories cannot get. To capture reciprocity, a concept formally described
by Rabin (1993) for normal form games and by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and
Falk and Fischbacher (2006) for sequential games, we assume that the worker’s utility
increases in the manager’s revenue whenever the manager provides the worker with a rent
in excess of his outside option. Thus when the manager is generous to the worker by giving
him something valuable (additional compensation), the worker desires to provide in turn
something of value to the manager (high eﬀort). The worker’s reciprocal attitude can now
be used by the manager to align the worker’s preferences with those of the manager, thus
generating intrinsic motivation. A worker’s decision whether to reciprocate will depend on
whether his extra eﬀort costs are outweighed by his extra utility from reciprocity. The latter
will depend on four components: The worker’s concern for reciprocity, the size of the initial
gift (i.e. the generosity of the wage oﬀer), the eﬀect of the extra eﬀort on the manager’s
revenue, and the worker’s ability (i.e. the inverse of his eﬀort costs). We derive two main
comparative statics on the nature of the optimal contract. A worker has a greater gift
exchange-based incentive to work hard if, ceteris paribus, he is more intrinsically reciprocal
or when the eﬀect of his eﬀort on the manager’s payoﬀ is greater. Furthermore, the wage
and the beneﬁt to the manager are complements in the workers utility function and hence,
while varying only one of these instruments will suﬃce to induce only the (relatively) high
ability workers to exert high eﬀort, changing both is necessary to also entice the (relatively)
low ability workers to work harder.
In particular, we make the following predictions about which workers, in terms of ability,
will be inﬂuenced by a change in wage. 1) When the eﬀect of output on the manager’s
payoﬀ is small, the high ability workers will be induced to exert eﬀort by a high wage
relative to a low wage. 2) When the eﬀect of output on the manager’s payoﬀ is larger,
the low ability workers will be induced to exert eﬀort by a high wage, relative to a low
wage. 3) Furthermore we can show that the response to these variations is stronger for
more reciprocal individuals. These detailed predictions allow us to make a more speciﬁc
test of the eﬀectiveness of gift-exchange.
The results of the experiment conﬁrm our predictions from above. In the treatment where
the manager has a small beneﬁt from eﬀort, we observe a signiﬁcant positive response to
2high wages among high ability workers, but not overall. In the high payoﬀ condition we ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant overall response to the high wage (between 2% and 11%), particularly among
the low ability workers (since in the high payoﬀ treatment high ability workers exerted
extensive eﬀort already without the high wage). We ﬁnd that this positive response is
stronger among highly reciprocal subjects, where it is not important whether reciprocal
inclination is measured directly via a trust game or indirectly via a personality test. Hence
our ﬁndings might have a wider applicability as personality tests are a prominent element
in ﬁrms’ hiring procedures. Using them allows ﬁrms to screen for reciprocal workers and
make use of the workers’ reciprocal motivation, in the process tailoring their incentive and
organizational structure to get the most out of them.
An extensive body of evidence has developed, demonstrating reciprocal behavior and gift
exchange in laboratory experiments. Fehr and Falk (2008) summarize the ﬁndings from
previous studies and highlight several key results: 1) Average wages in the experiments are
above the minimal wages and leave workers with rents. 2) There is a positive wage-eﬀort
relationship. 3) These results are robust to various institutions, to competition, and to
high stakes.2 Among the many variations of gift exchange games that have been run, two
recent laboratory experiments seem particularly related to our study. Hennig-Schmidt et
al (2008) present a real-eﬀort laboratory experiment and show that a positive wage-eﬀort
relation as implied by gift exchange only prevails if information on the employer’s surplus
is provided to the experimental workers. This indicates, as predicted by our model, that
the employer’s surplus is an important determinant of the eﬀectiveness of gift exchange
relations. Note, however, that Hennig-Schmidt et al (2008) do neither vary the surplus
accruing to the manager nor collect the additional information necessary to test our hy-
potheses. Maximiano et al (2007) show that the eﬀectiveness of gift exchange, i.e. the
positive wage-eﬀort relation, is only marginally weakened in a treatment where each em-
ployer has four workers (as compared to the classic bilateral gift exchange game). Because
in their design each of the workers has the same impact on the employer’s payoﬀ, our
model of reciprocity would predict that increasing the ﬁrm size should have no eﬀect on
the eﬀectiveness of gift exchange. Hence our predictions are consistent with their results.3
2For further reference see also Fehr and Gaechter (2000) or Fehr and Schmidt (2003) and the references
therein.
3There have also recently been a number of ﬁeld experiments with mixed results on the eﬀect of gift
exchange in natural settings. Falk (2007) reports strong evidence for gift exchange in the context of
charitable donations. On the other hand, Gneezy and List (2006) hire students for a day job and document
3The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the details of the
experiment, Section 3 derives the theoretical predictions, Section 4 sets out and analyzes
the experimental results and Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains some proofs,
additional tables and ﬁgures and the experimental instructions.
2 Experimental Design
The experiment took place in the CLER lab at Harvard Business School. We ran 20 ses-
sions in July 2007. In total we had 229 subjects from the CLER lab subject database
participating. They were told that they are participating in a study on decision making
behavior in markets. All subjects received a show-up fee of $10. The workers were exoge-
nously assigned to be either workers (192) or managers (37). Detailed instructions for the
lab experiment can be found in Appendix C.4
In our experiment, subjects in the manager role could hire a worker to perform a “coding
task” where workers have to match as many words to a speciﬁc code as possible in a pre-
speciﬁed time period of 25 minutes. We announced publicly that managers could choose to
hire workers at a ﬁxed wage payment of $10. If the manager chose not to hire a worker, they
both got $0. No manager chose not to hire a worker. Managers could also choose to surprise
the worker with a ﬁxed wage payment of $20, i.e. substantially higher than the $10 publicly
announced at the beginning of the experiment.5 By doing so we observed two values for
the size of the wage “gift” the workers received from the manager, i.e. we endogenously
create two diﬀerent wage conditions for the workers. If the manager decided not to oﬀer
the higher wage, the worker never learned about this option. The manager’s pay depended
on the number of correct answers solved by the workers (guessing was discouraged with
a penalty). To balance the number of observations between high and low wage oﬀers, we
matched multiple workers to some managers.
We exogenously created two diﬀerent payoﬀ conditions for the managers:
Low Payoﬀ Condition The manager receives $40, plus a premium of $0.04 for every
correct answer of the worker in the coding task, minus a penalty of $0.01 for every incorrect
that there is only a short lived eﬀect of a surprise rise of their hourly pay on the students’ eﬀort.
4On average the experiment lasted 60 minutes. Mean subject earnings were $ 29.43.
5Of the 37 managers, 3 chose to pay the higher wage of $20.
4answer, minus the wage payment to the worker. Eg., if the manager hires a worker for a
$10 wage and the worker has 200 correct and 3 incorrect answers the manager’s payoﬀ is
given by $40 + 200 ∗ $0.04 − 3 ∗ $0.01 − $10 = $37.97.
High Payoﬀ Condition The manager receives $10, plus a premium of $0.20 for every
correct answer of the worker in the coding task, minus a penalty of $0.05 for every incorrect
answer, minus the wage payment to the worker. Eg., if the manager hires a worker for a
$10 wage and the worker has 200 correct and 3 incorrect answers the manager’s payoﬀ is
given by $10 + 200 ∗ $0.20 − 3 ∗ $0.05 − $10 = $39.85.
Based on previous tests on the coding task, we picked the ﬁxed and variable components
of the manager’s pay such that the average payoﬀ of a manager should be roughly the same
across the two conditions in order to minimize the role for unconditional distributional
preferences.6 Hence we can perform a between subjects analysis as subjects were randomly
allocated into one of four treatment conditions ($10 wage/low payoﬀ, $20 wage/low payoﬀ,
$10 wage/high payoﬀ, $20 wage/high payoﬀ ).
In order to control for diﬀering ability we had all subjects do the coding task for 5
minutes after the main treatment was completed with a piece rate of $0.30 per correct
answer and a penalty of $0.08 per incorrect answer in order to discourage guessing. We
use the individual performance in this piece rate treatment to infer the workers’ diﬀering
abilities (or costs of eﬀort respectively).7
In order to be able to test our prediction with respect to reciprocity we had workers play
a trust game which we called the “sending task”. In the sending task, both the Sender [S]
and the Receiver [R] were given $10. S can choose to send between $0 and $10 to R. Any
amount sent was tripled and S kept any money that was not sent to R. R can then send
back any amount up to the total amount received. We used the strategy method and the
subjects were asked for their decision proﬁle in both roles. We randomly picked one of the
roles and randomly matched it with one of the other participants’ decisions to determine
the payoﬀ from this task. In order to relate our ﬁndings to real world hiring practices
(which very rarely involve eliciting trust game responses from applicants) we had workers
6In fact the overall average number of correct answers was roughly 197, i.e. very close to the 200 we
assumed for this calibration.
7On average the subjects answered 47.7 questions correctly with a standard deviation of 12.1, a minimum
of 7, and a maximum of 87. We do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant inﬂuence of prior treatment assignment on the
performance in the test.
5take a “Big 5” personality test, which is commonly used by ﬁrms in their hiring procedures
(see Autor and Scarborough, 2008).
The ﬁnal payment of the subjects was determined by a dice and was either their payoﬀ
from the worker/manager coding task, the piece rate coding task or the sending task.
3 Theoretical Predictions
3.1 A simple Model of reciprocal Motivation
To derive our hypotheses we consider a simple model that captures the intuition of the
experiment.8 Assume there is a risk neutral manager who wants to maximize expected
proﬁts and a risk averse worker who cares about reciprocity. Assume that there are n
states of the world that are characterized by payoﬀs qi with i = 1,...,n respectively. The
worker can take one of two actions (eﬀort levels) a1 and a2 with a1 < a2 and corresponding
costs from eﬀort c(·) with c(a2) − c(a1) = ∆c > 0. The two actions imply respective
probabilities of the states πi (a1) and πi (a2) where for the respective expected return of




πi(a1)qi = ER(a1) holds. In order to capture
our experimental variation we introduce the scalar M which reﬂects the monetary value of
output qi to the manager, i.e. M · ER(ai) is the expected monetary gross return for the
manager from action ai and M · ∆ER = M · ER(a2) − M · ER(a1) is the gross beneﬁt for
the manager if the worker chooses a2 instead of a1.
A contract (w,ˆ a) is a ﬁxed wage payment w, as well as an expected action ˆ a. In a real
world context we could think of ˆ a as an informal job description or a code of conduct.
In the lab we will interpret ˆ a as a commonly understood norm. Given our focus here on
changes in behavior these details are not key to our results. While ˆ a is not binding, in the
model it serves to ﬁx the worker’s beliefs about the manager’s intended generosity (since
the expected utility of a contract depends on the worker’s action).
The worker’s inherent concern for reciprocity is measured by η ∈ [0,+∞). We allow for
potentially diﬀering costs of eﬀort (i.e. diﬀering abilities), captured by a scalar γ > 0. The
8We consider a simpliﬁed version of the model in Englmaier and Leider (2008) who solve the full moral
hazard problem and derive the structure of optimal contracts in a standard principal agent problem with
reciprocal agents.
6worker’s utility function under the contract ( ˜ w,ˆ a), given that he takes action a′, is given
by
U (a
′,ˆ a) = u(˜ w) − γc(a
′) + η(u(˜ w) − γc(ˆ a) − ¯ u)M · ER(a
′)
where ¯ u is the worker’s outside option. The utility function consists of three parts:
i) utility from the monetary wage payment u(˜ w), ii) reciprocal utility η (u(˜ w) − γc(ˆ a) − ¯ u)M·
ER(a′), and iii) eﬀort costs γc(a′).
Hence a “generous” contract is one that provides a rent to the worker, i.e. an expected
monetary utility in excess of the worker’s outside option. A more generous contract will
induce the worker to feel more reciprocal, which here means that he will derive greater
marginal and absolute utility from the manager’s revenue.
Now consider the decision of a worker whether to work hard, i.e. choose a2, or not. To
make the problem non-trivial, assume the manager wants to implement a2. A worker will
prefer to choose a2 over a1 if and only if
U (a2,a2) ≥ U (a1,a2)
η (u(˜ w) − γc(a2) − ¯ u)M · ∆ER ≥ γ∆c
η(u(˜ w) − ¯ u)M · ∆ER
ηc(a2)M · ∆ER + ∆c
≥ γ
∗
This condition immediately tells us, that for a given wage ˜ w and a given monetary value
M only workers with eﬀort costs below a critical threshold γ∗ will choose to work hard,
i.e. those with relatively high ability. This threshold can be relaxed (i.e. more people
be induced to choose a2) if M (the monetary value to the manager) is increased or when
a higher wage is paid (i.e. increasing u(˜ w)). An increase in η, the worker’s reciprocal
inclination has the same eﬀect as an increase in M. The following Lemma 1 summarizes
these results.
Lemma 1 [Reciprocity] The critical value for working hard, γ∗, is strictly positive and
deﬁned by
η(u(˜ w) − ¯ u)M · ∆ER
ηc(a2)M · ∆ER + ∆c
= γ
∗.










7Figure 1: Behavioral Predictions - Marginally Aﬀected Agent




It is important to note, that this implies that for a high M workers with relatively lower
ability will be aﬀected by a wage increase. Intuitively speaking, increasing either M or ˜ w
alone does not suﬃce to induce the low ability workers to work hard, but only the high
ability workers. Only increasing M and ˜ w together, due to their complementarity, induces
the low ability workers to work. However, the complementarity has little eﬀect on the high
ability types as they already work hard if either M or ˜ w is increased. We will exploit
this reasoning on the identity of the marginally aﬀected worker to diﬀerentiate our model’s
predictions from alternative interpretations.
Combining these arguments leads to several predictions which can be neatly summarized
in Figure 1: 1) When the eﬀect of output on the manager’s payoﬀ is small, the set of
workers induced to exert eﬀort by a high wage, relative to a low wage, will be the high
ability (low eﬀort cost) workers. 2) When the eﬀect of output on the manager’s payoﬀ is
larger, the set of workers induced to exert eﬀort by a high wage, relative to a low wage, will
be the low ability (high eﬀort cost) workers. 3) These behavioral changes will be greatest
among the most reciprocal workers.
83.2 Alternative Preference Speciﬁcations
We are going to contrast these predictions with three other prominent approaches that have
been used to organize observed behavior in gift exchange experiments: standard preferences
(as a benchmark), social welfare preferences, as stressed by e.g. Charness and Rabin (2002),
and inequity aversion following Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
Behavioral Predictions under Standard Preferences: The standard model of selﬁsh
preferences is a special case of the reciprocity model with η = 0. Because our experiment
has only ﬂat wages (rather than outcome-contingent transfers), there is no way to induce
a selﬁsh worker with positive eﬀort costs to choose a2. Trivially therefore, increasing M or
˜ w will have no eﬀect. This is summarized in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 [Standard Preferences] γ∗
Standard = 0 and the according comparative statics






∂ ˜ w = 0,
∂2γ∗
standard
∂M∂ ˜ w = 0.
Behavioral Predictions under Social Welfare Preferences: As stressed by e.g. Char-
ness and Rabin (2002), social welfare preferences, i.e. the desire to increase social eﬃciency,
might play a role in determining behavior. To capture this idea in a simple way, consider
a worker who maximizes the weighted sum of his own utility and the manager’s revenue,
uSW = θ(u(˜ w) − γc(a)) + (1 − θ)(M · ER(a) − ˜ w)
where θ ∈ [0,1] is the relative weight of the two components. Analogously to above consider
the decision of a worker whether to work hard, i.e. choose a2, or not. A worker will prefer
to choose a2 over a1 if and only if
USW (a2) ≥ USW (a1)








We can immediately see that there is a strictly positive threshold for γ∗
SW that is increas-
ing in M but independent of ˜ w as it is only a transfer with no welfare implications. Hence
there is no complementarity between M and ˜ w.
Lemma 3 [Social Welfare Preferences] The critical value for working hard, γ∗, is






















Behavioral Predictions with Inequity Aversion: Inequity aversion is perhaps the
most prominent form of (outcome based) social preferences that has been employed to
organize non-standard laboratory behavior. Using the formulation of inequity aversion
(IA) by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) the worker’s utility is given by
uIA = u(˜ w) − γc(a) − αmax[ER(a) − 2˜ w + γc(a),0] − β max[2 ˜ w − γc(a) − ER(a),0]
where α weights unfavorable inequality and β favorable inequality.9 For the parametrization
of our experiment the manager is (almost) always better oﬀ, hence - to ease exposition -
we focus on this case.10
uIA = u(˜ w) − γc(a) − αmax[ER(a) − 2˜ w + γc(a),0].
Analogously to above consider the decision of a worker whether to work hard, i.e. choose
a2, or not. A worker will prefer to choose a2 over a1 if and only if
UIA (a2) ≥ UIA (a1)
−α[ER(a2) − ER(a1)] ≥ (1 + α)γc(a2) − (1 + α)γc(a1)
−





There exists no positive value γ∗
IA such that a2 is induced and increasing M decreases γ∗
IA
while the increase of ˜ w has no eﬀect. Hence M and ˜ w are not complements.
Lemma 4 [Inequity Aversion] There exists no positive value γ∗
IA such that a2 is in-
duced:
−



















9Given that we have only two actors, the formulation of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) would give the
same results.
10See Appendix A for a case where the worker is better oﬀ. In particular the comparative statics w.r.t.
˜ w remain unchanged as compared to the present case.
103.3 Predictions
Combining the results from our model and the three alternatives leads us to formulate the
following three predictions that we test in our experimental analysis.
Prediction 1 When the eﬀect of output on the manager’s payoﬀ is small, the eﬀect on
eﬀort of a high wage relative to a low wage will be mainly driven by the high ability workers
and not by the low ability workers.
Prediction 2 When the eﬀect of output on the manager’s payoﬀ is larger, the eﬀect on
eﬀort of a high wage relative to a low wage will be mainly driven by the low ability workers
and not by the high ability workers.
Note that none of the other models predicts a diﬀerential eﬀect of a high wage on the
eﬀort of high and low ability workers based on the manager’s payoﬀ. Nor does the workers’
reciprocal inclination matter in any of these models, while it naturally does in our model.
Prediction 3 The above eﬀects will be more pronounced among more reciprocal subjects.
4 Experimental Results
4.1 Results
Worker output was measured at 30-second intervals. We will use these high-frequency mea-
surements, as well as the total output over the 25 minute task. We begin by considering the
mean and median for the total number of questions answered in each treatment, presented
in Table 1.
Oﬀering a high wage increased output by almost 9.5 questions in the low payoﬀ treatment,
and by 13 questions in the high payoﬀ treatment. Pooling the two payoﬀ treatments, the
eﬀect of the wage oﬀer on the raw means is marginally signiﬁcant (ranksum test p =
0.0591).11 However, since individuals vary widely in ability, we will need to control for that
11Similarly, for managers the gross payoﬀ (not including the wage payment) was higher with the $20
wage: $47.51 (low wage) vs. $48.01 (high wage) in the low payoﬀ treatment, and $46.82 (low wage)
vs. $50.26 (high wage) in the high payoﬀ treatment. Note, however, that the value of this increase in
11Table 1: Mean Number of Correct Answers in the Coding Task
Manager Payoﬀ
Worker Wage Low High
Mean 192.51 190.79
$10 SD 48.20 66.58
N 43 53
Mean 201.95 203.94
$20 SD 56.20 50.91
N 44 52
Ranksum comparison of $20 Wage vs $10 Wage: p = 0.0591.
Table 2: Performance by Quartiles of Baseline Speed
Treatment Baseline Speed (Quartiles)
Worker Manager Q4 - Q1
Wage Payoﬀ [7,40] [41,47] [48,57] [58,87] Diﬀ
$10 Low 162.92 187.00 194.54 237.22 74.30
$20 Low 131.73 192.20 219.00 258.83 127.11
$10 High 146.50 176.86 189.56 256.14 109.64
$20 High 167.25 190.50 210.11 253.00 85.75
Mean baseline speed in each treatment: ($10, Low) = 47.26, ($10, High) = 47.85, ($20, Low) = 47.66,
($20, High) = 47.96.
to get a good estimate of the treatment eﬀect. In Table 2, we show the mean output in
each treatment for individuals in each quartile of performance in the piece rate coding task.
As one would imagine, individuals of higher ability performed better in the coding task
than those with lower ability. Moreover, the individuals in the $20 wage/high payoﬀ treat-
ment answer more questions than in the baseline $10 wage/low payoﬀ treatment for all
ability quartiles. However, the impact of ability is diﬀerent between the treatments. In the
intermediate treatments - i.e. $20 wage/low payoﬀ and $10 wage/high payoﬀ the change
productivity is less than the extra $10 in wage payments, hence ﬁrms oﬀering the low wage had the highest
proﬁt.
12in output between the lowest and highest quartiles is much larger than in the baseline or in
the $20 wage/high payoﬀ treatment. The highest ability individuals answer substantially
more correct answers in these treatments than in the baseline treatment, and look similar
to the $20 wage/high payoﬀ treatment. This is already consistent with our Predictions 1
and 2 and is not predicted by the other models.
To that end, we allow in our speciﬁcation for separate intercepts and speed coeﬃcients in
each treatment. We estimate using our high-frequency observations of eﬀort (the number
of correct answers per 30-second interval)12. We run Random-Eﬀects with a time trend,
as well as Random-Eﬀects with AR1 errors, and GLS with panel-speciﬁc AR1 errors and
between-panel heteroskedasticity13.
The estimates for regressing the total number of correct answers are presented in Table
3. Both the $20 wage/low payoﬀ and $10 wage/high payoﬀ exhibit a signiﬁcantly negative
intercept and a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient on speed (above and beyond the eﬀect of
speed in the baseline treatment). Thus, as can also be seen in the table of means, the lowest
ability individuals performed somewhat worse, while higher ability individuals performed
better than baseline when wages were raised. We ﬁnd a small but insigniﬁcant eﬀect at
the median for the low payoﬀ treatment (0.056 questions per 30 second, or 2.8 questions
overall), but a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect for the high payoﬀ treatment (0.08 questions per
30 seconds, or 4 questions overall). Figure 2 shows the estimated diﬀerence in output from
oﬀering a high wage within a payoﬀ treatment at various speed percentiles. In the low
payoﬀ treatment, oﬀering a high wage has a positive eﬀect on high ability workers, and a
negative eﬀect on low ability workers. For the high payoﬀ treatment, in contrast, oﬀering
a high wage has a positive eﬀect on low ability workers, and a negligible eﬀect on high
ability workers (since they are already working hard even with a low wage). Both eﬀects
are positive but not signiﬁcant at the median ability. The negative eﬀect for low ability
workers is not directly predicted by our theory, nor by any of the other models. However,
we will argue in the discussion that it can be consistent with our model if we consider
negative reciprocity.
12Estimating the same speciﬁcation on Productivity = # Correct Answers - 0.25 * Mistakes yields
quantitatively and qualitatively very similar results. Repeating the same exercise with total output over
25 minutes as dependent variable yields similar results, though less precisely estimated.
13A Wooldridge test for serial correlation ﬁnds autocorrelation (p < 0.01), and a Likelihood Ratio test
suggests panel heteroscedasticity (p < 0.01).
13Table 3: Number of Correct Answers (per 30-second period)
Coeﬃcients (1) (2) (3)
Baseline Speed 0.0332*** 0.0332*** 0.0455***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.0037)
Wage = $20 -1.704*** -1.692*** -1.400***
(0.61) (0.65) (0.20)
Manager Payoﬀ High -2.281*** -2.276*** -1.624***
(0.69) (0.64) (0.21)
($20 Wage) X (High Payoﬀ) 2.607*** 2.583*** 2.037***
(0.88) (0.89) (0.30)
($20 Wage) X Speed 0.0383*** 0.0381*** 0.0310***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.0042)
(High Payoﬀ) X Speed 0.0454*** 0.0453*** 0.0357*** )
(0.014) (0.013) (0.0045)






Demographic Dummies YES YES YES
Panel Structure Rand. Eﬀ. Rand. Eﬀ. Heterosked.
Time-Error Structure Time Trend AR-1 AR-1
Constant 1.915* 2.749*** 2.354***
(0.98) (1.01) (0.29)
Observations 9300 9300 9300
Number of subjects 186 186 186
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
Demographic dummies include dummy variables for gender, race, age, work experience, and student
status.











1st %ile 10th %ile 25th %ile 40th %ile 50th %ile 60th %ile 75th %ile 90th %ile 99th %ile
Predicted Wage Effect ($20 - $10)
Low Payoff High Payoff
All predicted wage eﬀects for the Low Payoﬀ condition are signiﬁcant except for the 40th and 50th
percentiles. All predicted wage eﬀects for the High Payoﬀ condition at the 50th percentile and below are
signiﬁcant. All diﬀerences between the payoﬀ conditions are signiﬁcant except for the 50th percentile.
We also relax the linearity assumption by estimating a speciﬁcation with dummies for
each tercile of baseline speed.14 Our results from above are qualitatively unchanged. Table
6 in Appendix B presents this regression.
Figure 3 presents the estimated wage eﬀects for the low and high payoﬀ treatments for
each of the three ability groups. As in our linear speciﬁcation we ﬁnd that in the low
payoﬀ treatment, there is a negative eﬀect of the wage on the lowest ability workers, and
a positive eﬀect on higher ability workers. In the high payoﬀ condition, in contrast, we
ﬁnd that the largest wage eﬀect is among low ability workers; with a smaller positive eﬀect
among moderate ability workers and a small negative eﬀect among high ability workers. As
before, the small/negative treatment eﬀect among high ability workers is because almost
all of the workers with high ability are exerting eﬀort across diﬀerent treatments. Taking
the average treatment eﬀect for the whole sample, we actually ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative
eﬀect in the low payoﬀ treatment (−0.34 questions per 30 seconds, or 17 questions over the
whole task) - driven by the above mentioned negative response of the low ability workers.
In the high payoﬀ treatment we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect overall (0.44 questions
14We choose three groups so that later when we separate out subjects with diﬀerent preference types we
have enough subjects in each ability-preference category to generate good estimates.














Slowest Third Middle Third Fastest Third
Wage Effects ($20 - $10)
$20/Low $20/High
Predicted wage eﬀects for the Low Payoﬀ condition are signiﬁcant for the slowest and middle terciles of
speed. All predicted wage eﬀects for the High Payoﬀ condition are signiﬁcant. Diﬀerences between the
payoﬀ conditions are signiﬁcant for the slowest and fastest speed terciles.
per 30 seconds, or 22 questions over the whole task). The diﬀerence between the payoﬀ
treatments is also signiﬁcant.
While our results accord with the predictions of our reciprocity model, we want to further
strengthen the case that the observed gift-exchange represents “reciprocity”. To that end,
we look to the results from our trust game to identify those individuals who are most likely
to be reciprocal types. We should expect that our experimental sample is a mix of “selﬁsh”
subjects and “reciprocal” subjects, and that treatment manipulations have a stronger eﬀect
on the more reciprocal subjects. Therefore, if we can focus the estimates of the treatment
eﬀect on the reciprocal subjects, then the estimated treatment eﬀects should be larger
(since they will not be averaged with the subjects who exhibit no treatment eﬀects).
In the trust game we have all subjects specify an amount to return to the sender for
each possible sender decision. This gives us a complete return function for all subjects.
The literature on reciprocity generally considers an upwards-sloping return function (i.e.
the subject returns a larger amount when the sender has been more trusting/generous) to
be indicative of positive reciprocity. For example, Camerer and Fehr (2004) describe the
16standard results in the literature as follows: “The amount trustees repay increases with y
[the amount sent], which can be interpreted as positive reciprocity, or a feeling of obligation
to pay more to an investor who has exhibited trust”.15 Since subjects’ decisions are largely
(but not completely) monotonic, we will use as our measure of reciprocity the diﬀerence
between the largest and smallest fraction returned to the sender.16 Very similar results may
be obtained by using the diﬀerence between the $1 and $10 decision, or by using the slope
of the linear ﬁt to the return function. On average responders return an approximately
constant fraction of the amount sent - between 30% and 35% (except when $1 is sent, when
responders return 26%). At the subject level, thirty percent of subjects return a constant
fraction, and the median diﬀerence between the smallest fraction returned and the largest
fraction returned is 22%.
One may be concerned that the coding task may have inﬂuenced decisions in the trust
game. However, our results there are very similar to the results in the literature, e.g. in
Ashraf et al. (2006). Moreover, the distribution of the reciprocity measure is not diﬀerent
between the treatments (regressing the reciprocity measure on treatment dummies yields
p-values > 0.5 for each treatment.).17
15Ashraf et al. (2006) have subjects play both a trust game and a dictator game, and ﬁnd that for
subjects in the US the increasing slope of the return function cannot be fully explained by distributional
preferences, suggesting reciprocity distinctly related to positive actions by the ﬁrst mover as an explanation.
16In our experiment, on average the diﬀerence was 0.23 with a standard deviation of 0.197, a minimum
of 0, and a maximum of 0.81.
17Note that even if one task inﬂuenced the other, it would still suggest that the two tasks are measuring
the same aspect of social preferences, i.e. the same mechanism driving the behavior.
17Table 4: Eﬀects of Reciprocity
(1) Composite Coeﬃcients
Coeﬃcients X (Max - Min) 33rd %ile 50th %ile 60th %ile 75th %ile
Baseline Speed 0.0516*** -0.0269
(0.0058) (0.019)
Wage = $20 -1.373*** -0.518 -1.456*** -1.488*** -1.508*** -1.555***
(0.33) (1.04) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) (0.22)
Manager Payoﬀ High -0.378 -4.228*** -1.055*** -1.308*** -1.478*** -1.858***
(0.39) (1.18) (0.26) (0.23) (0.22) (0.24)
($20 Wage) X (High Payoﬀ) 0.971* 4.006** 1.612*** 1.852*** 2.013*** 2.374***
(0.54) (1.65) (0.35) (0.31) (0.29) (0.32)
($20 Wage) X Speed 0.0290*** 0.0151 0.0314*** 0.0323*** 0.0329*** 0.0343***
(0.007) (0.022) (0.0046) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0046)
(High Payoﬀ) X Speed 0.0116 0.0813*** 0.0246*** 0.0295*** 0.0327*** 0.0401***
(0.0081) (0.025) (0.0053) (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0049)
($20 Wage) X (High Pay.) X Spd. -0.0185* -0.0925*** 0.0333*** -0.0388*** -0.0426*** -0.0509***
(0.011) (0.033) (0.0071) (0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0064)






Number of Subjects 186
The ﬁrst column reports main eﬀects of treatment variables. The second column reports the coeﬃcients for the interaction between the treatment
variables and the reciprocity measure. The last four columns reports the total coeﬃcient at various quantiles of reciprocity. The reciprocity
measure for each reported quantile: 0.15, 0.22, 0.26, 0.35. Speciﬁcation includes heteroskedastic and panel level AR-1 errors. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. Demographic dummies include dummy variables for gender,
race, age, work experience, and student status.
1
8Table 4 presents results when we also calculate total treatment coeﬃcients evaluated at
various levels of reciprocity, reported in the last four columns. This indicates the magnitude
of the treatment eﬀect for a subject with a reciprocity type of varying levels. Note that
all of the treatment coeﬃcients increase in level as reciprocity increases, particularly the
coeﬃcients in the high payoﬀ treatment. This suggests that while there is some small un-
derlying level of gift-exchange for selﬁsh types, the majority of the substantial gift exchange
we observe in the high payoﬀ treatment for the full sample is being driven by high reci-
procity types. The eﬀect of reciprocity can also be seen if we instead use a dummy denoting
subjects with a high measure of reciprocity (in particular, above the 66th percentile), and
dummies for ability groups. Table 7 in Appendix B presents this regression.
To see the eﬀect of reciprocal preferences, Figure 4 presents the estimated eﬀects of
oﬀering a higher wage for the low and high payoﬀ treatments respectively. In the low
payoﬀ treatment low-reciprocity subjects of all ability levels exhibit a negative response to
the high wage oﬀer, while medium and high ability subjects with high reciprocity respond
positively. The overall eﬀect is signiﬁcant for low reciprocity workers (−0.27 questions per
30 seconds, or 13.5 questions overall), while the eﬀect is insigniﬁcant for high reciprocity
workers (0.09 questions per 30 seconds). The diﬀerence in between the low and high
reciprocity subjects is signiﬁcant (0.36 questions per 30 seconds, or 18 questions for the
whole task). For the high payoﬀ treatment both low-reciprocity and high-reciprocity types
show a positive response among low ability types; however the high reciprocity types have
a positive response among middle ability subjects, and a negative response among high
ability subjects. Both groups show a positive overall eﬀect of the wage increase (0.19 and
0.24 questions per 30 seconds, or 9.5 and 12 questions overall), with the diﬀerence being
positive but not signiﬁcant. Taken together, this conﬁrms our Prediction 3.
Though real ﬁrms typically will not use information from an experimental trust game
when hiring workers, personality tests are quite common in the hiring practices of ﬁrms (cf.
Autor and Scarborough, 2008). Thus, we now look to the results of the Big-5 Personality
Test which we had subjects complete at the end of the experiment.
We then identify subjects who score highly on the trait “agreeableness”, which has been
shown experimentally to relate to reciprocity (see Ben-Ner et al. 2004, Ashton et al.
1997).18 High agreeableness corresponds with one of the criteria Autor and Scarborough
18While Ben-Ner et al. (2004) and Ashton et al. (1997) also ﬁnd some evidence that “openness” and
“emotional stability” may relate to reciprocity as well, the relationship between reciprocity and agreeable-
19Figure 4: Wage Eﬀects with Reciprocity Dummies
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Predicted wage eﬀects for the Low Payoﬀ condition are signiﬁcant except for the middle speed tercile of
low reciprocity workers. Predicted wage eﬀects for the High Payoﬀ condition are signiﬁcant except for the
middle and fastest speed terciles of low reciprocity workers. Diﬀerences between low and high reciprocity
workers are signiﬁcant except for the slowest speed tercile in the High Payoﬀ condition.
identify in the hiring practice of the ﬁrm they study.19
We begin by regressing our reciprocity measure on the z-scores for the ﬁve personality
traits.20 The results are presented in Table 8 in Appendix B. In accordance with the pre-
vious literature we ﬁnd a (marginally) signiﬁcant positive relationship between reciprocity
and agreeableness.
To identify the diﬀering treatment eﬀect among high agreeableness subjects we deﬁne
a dummy variable denoting if a subject is above the 66th percentile in agreeableness. We
then estimate our output regression interacting all of the treatment variables with the
personality dummy. The results are presented in Table 5. As with reciprocity, subjects
with high agreeableness exhibit treatment eﬀects of greater magnitude, suggesting they
are driving a substantial portion of our eﬀect. Given the signiﬁcant positive relationship
between reciprocity and agreeableness it should not be surprising that the results here
parallel the results we obtained using the information from the experimental trust game.
ness was most robust across speciﬁcation and sample.
19The ﬁrm gave hiring preference to applicants with positive z-scores for agreeableness, conscientiousness,
and extroversion.
20Each subject’s raw score was calculated based on the sum of their self-ratings for each trait. A few
subjects skipped one of the questions; their raw score was rescaled by 10/9; our results do not qualitatively
change if we exclude these subjects. The raw scores for each trait were than standardized to have mean 0
and standard deviation 1.
20Table 5: Eﬀect of Agreeableness (as a Proxy for Reciprocity)
(1) Composite
Coeﬃcients X Agreeable if Agreeable
Baseline Speed 0.0435*** 0.00253
(0.0048) (0.0075)
Wage = $20 -1.297*** -0.839** -2.137***
(0.25) (0.43) (0.33)
Manager Payoﬀ High -1.053*** -1.334*** -2.387***
(0.28) (0.44) (0.34)
($20 Wage) X (High Payoﬀ) 1.798*** 0.965* 2.763***
(0.37) (0.56) (0.31)
($20 Wage) X Speed 0.0300*** 0.0139 0.0439***
(0.0055) (0.0089) (0.0067)
(High Payoﬀ) X Speed 0.0281*** 0.0189** 0.0470***
(0.0061) (0.0091) (0.0069)
($20 Wage) X (High Pay) X Spd. -0.0421*** -0.0109 -0.0530***
(0.0078) (0.011) (0.0083)






Number of Subjects 186
The ﬁrst column reports main eﬀects of treatment variables. The second column reports the coeﬃcients
for the interaction between the treatment variables and the agreeableness proxy for reciprocity. The
dummy for high agreeableness denotes subjects whose agreeableness score is at the 66th percentile or
higher. Speciﬁcation includes heteroskedastic and panel level AR-1 errors. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Signiﬁcance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. Demographic dummies
include dummy variables for gender, race, age, work experience, and student status.
21Figure 5: Wage Eﬀects with Personality Test Dummies
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(b) High Manager Payoﬀ
Predicted wage eﬀects for the Low Payoﬀ condition are signiﬁcant except for the slowest and middle
speed tercile of high agreeableness workers. Predicted wage eﬀects for the High Payoﬀ condition are
signiﬁcant except for the middle tercile of low agreeableness workers and the middle and fastest speed
terciles of high agreeableness workers. Diﬀerences between low and high agreeableness workers are
signiﬁcant except for the middle speed terciles in each payoﬀ condition.
To better understand the diﬀerences between low and high agreeableness subjects, we
again estimate a speciﬁcation with dummies for low, middle and high ability workers. The
results are presented in Table 9 in Appendix B.
Figure 5 presents the eﬀects of oﬀering a high wage on output for low and high agree-
ableness workers in the low and high payoﬀ treatments respectively. In the low payoﬀ
treatment, the low agreeableness workers have a signiﬁcantly negative response among low
and high ability workers; the overall eﬀect is also negative −0.21 questions per 30 seconds,
or −10.5 questions for the whole task. High agreeableness workers, however, have a posi-
tive response for all ability levels, with signiﬁcance in the high ability group. The overall
eﬀect of oﬀering the high wage is positive (0.25 questions per 30 seconds, or 12.5 questions
over the whole task), and the diﬀerence between the low and high agreeableness workers
is positive and signiﬁcant (0.46 questions per 30 seconds, or 23 questions overall). Simi-
larly, in the high payoﬀ treatment, highly agreeable workers are aﬀected more positively
by the high wage oﬀer, with non-agreeable workers showing no positive response (0.0033
questions per 30 seconds for low agreeableness workers, 0.31 questions per 30 seconds for
high agreeableness workers - 15.5 questions overall). The overall diﬀerence between low
and high agreeableness workers is also signiﬁcant (0.30 questions per 30 seconds).
224.2 Discussion
Revisiting our predictions, we ﬁnd several points supporting our reciprocity-based model.
We ﬁnd an increase in output when subjects are paid a high wage by their manager and
this increase is larger and more signiﬁcant when the manager has a larger beneﬁt from high
eﬀort. We also ﬁnd that the strongest increase in eﬀort in the low payoﬀ treatment was
among high ability workers, while the strongest increase in the high payoﬀ treatment was
among low ability workers. This accords with our prediction that increasing the value of
output to the manager should make the marginal worker induced to exert eﬀort to be a
lower ability worker, since high ability workers may exert eﬀort even without the high wage.
We also ﬁnd evidence that subjects that can be identiﬁed as reciprocal will exhibit a more
positive response of their eﬀort from a high wage oﬀer. We can identify these subjects
either directly via a trust game, or indirectly via a personality test. This latter ﬁnding
points at a wider applicability of our results as personality tests are a prominent element in
ﬁrms’ hiring procedures. Their usage may point at ﬁrms using reciprocal motivations and
tailoring their incentive and organizational structure to get the most mileage out of them.
In Englmaier and Leider (2008) we follow this reasoning and ﬁnd suggestive evidence for
this kind of ﬁrm behavior.
As in many previous studies, standard preferences do not explain behavior well in our
experiment, since the standard model predicts no change in eﬀort for any of our treatments.
Additionally, social welfare preferences, while predicting a positive eﬀort response to
an increase in the eﬀect of output on the manager’s payoﬀ, fail to explain the positive
response to an increase in the wage and the diﬀerential eﬀects of the treatments on the
diﬀerent ability types. Inequity aversion, rather than reciprocity, has often been used to
model gift-exchange in studying agency problems. However, inequity aversion has signif-
icant limitations in modeling gift-exchange. With weak or no monetary incentives, social
preferences in the form of inequity aversion will only induce the worker to exert eﬀort if
either 1) eﬀort reduces the worker’s advantageous inequality, i.e. if the worker begins with
a larger payoﬀ than the manager and the manager receives > 50% of the proﬁt from the
worker’s eﬀort OR 2) eﬀort reduces the worker’s disadvantageous inequality, i.e. the worker
begins with a smaller payoﬀ than the manager and the worker receives > 50% of the proﬁt
from his own eﬀort. Moreover, the introduction of a high wage will only induce excess ef-
fort if it creates (or exacerbates) one of these conditions. Typically lab gift-exchange games
operate under the ﬁrst setup. If the manager oﬀers a low wage, then the manager and the
23worker will have relatively equal payoﬀs if the worker does not work, and the manager will
be enriched by eﬀort. If the manager oﬀers a high wage, then the worker will have a much
higher payoﬀ if he does not work, but can bring up the manager’s payoﬀ to be more equal
if he does work.
In our experiment, however, in the low payoﬀ treatment neither of these conditions is
true. For both the low and high wage, the manager has a higher payoﬀ than the worker, and
when the worker works hard he only further increases the inequality. Therefore, inequity
aversion could not be causing the worker to work hard, and if anything should cause
the worker to purposefully answer questions incorrectly to lower the manager’s payoﬀ.
Moreover, since the marginal eﬀect of eﬀort on inequality is the same under the low and
high wage, under the standard Fehr-Schmidt preferences for inequity aversion, the eﬀect of
this form of social preferences should be the same regardless of the wage. Moreover, since
the eﬀort of higher ability workers will increase inequality by a greater amount, they should
be less likely to work hard in both wage conditions. For the high payoﬀ treatments, while
the high wage case is in general ambiguous (since for less than 150 correct answers the
worker has a higher payoﬀ than the manager) the vast majority of workers (88%) answer
enough questions correctly that the manager will have a higher payoﬀ, and more than half
(57%) answer enough questions that the manager’s payoﬀ is at least $10 larger than theirs.
Moreover, in the low wage condition, the worker will be at a disadvantage if he answers
at least 50 questions correctly (which all but one worker does), and 88% answer enough
questions that the manager has at least a $10 higher payoﬀ than the worker. However,
the higher value of correct answers to the manager, and in particular the higher impact
of eﬀort for high ability workers, should mean that inequity averse workers work less hard
(especially high ability ones). Hence, inequity aversion does not explain the treatment
eﬀects in our experiment.
As mentioned above, the negative eﬀect of a wage increase for low ability workers is not
directly predicted by our theory, nor any of the other models, however it can be consistent
with the model if we consider negative reciprocity. In our basic model reciprocity can
only have positive eﬀects, since the contract must meet the worker’s individual rationality
constraint - i.e. he has to be willing to accept the contract because it is better than his
outside option. In our experiment, however, the worker did not have the ability to choose
an outside option. Low ability workers may interpret a high wage (given low payoﬀs) from
the manager as indicative of high expectations of output to justify the wage. In fact, if low
24ability means high cost of eﬀort, then the low ability worker may feel that the manager’s
expectations for his eﬀort/output are too high. That is, he may believe that the manager
expects such a high eﬀort that the worker’s utility is in fact negative. This may lead the
worker to shirk so that the manager is “punished”. Similarly, high payoﬀs may also lead
the workers to believe the manager expects great eﬀort and output (since it is so valuable
to the manager). Moreover, if we use Productivity =# Correct Answers - 0.25 * Mistakes
as dependent variable the overall adverse eﬀect, driven by the lowest workers, of a wage
increase is moderated and no longer signiﬁcant, casting some doubt on the stability of this
eﬀect. See Appendix ?? for a comparison of the most relevant calibrations for both output
measures.
5 Conclusion
The importance of fairness and social preferences for the work relation has long been
documented. Based on our earlier work, Englmaier and Leider (2008), we argue that a
key determinant of the eﬀectiveness of using reciprocal motivations to provide incentives
is the ability of a worker to repay a gift, i.e. the magnitude of the manager’s beneﬁt from
high eﬀort is crucial to gift-exchange. We test our model in the lab by manipulating the
extent to which the manager beneﬁts from worker eﬀort. In the experiment we ﬁnd that
the manager’s beneﬁt has important eﬀects on behavior: we observe positive gift exchange
when the manager directly beneﬁts from worker output. We collect additional data so we
can identify the non-trivial role workers’ abilities play in determining individual responses
to an initial gift. Furthermore, we can identify reciprocal subjects from their trust game
responses, and show that they exhibit a greater response to a high wage. We also use
standard personality tests to classify types as reciprocal and get comparable results.
Our study indicates that employing workers’ reciprocity to provide incentives is a viable
alternative and can be successfully done. However, if a ﬁrm wishes to use reciprocal incen-
tives, it may be important that various complementary parts of the ﬁrm’s compensation and
HR policy are coordinated to maximize the eﬀect of reciprocity. Our experimental results
suggest that a ﬁrm hoping to induce a gift-exchange with its workers may be most success-
ful when the worker’s manager directly beneﬁts from worker eﬀort, and when workers have
been selected at hiring to be highly reciprocal.
25Our study is an early step towards more fully exploring this topic, and there are many
fruitful directions for future research. For example, further empirical work can explore the
optimal magnitude of the wage gift and the proper mix between reciprocal and explicit mo-
tivation to maximize the proﬁtability of gift exchange. Our theoretical model suggests that
a job where explicit incentives work poorly due to a noisy production function, and where
output is highly valuable to the manager is the environment where reciprocal incentives
should be most attractive.
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27A Alternative Predictions
Using the formulation of inequity aversion (IA) by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and, in contrast
to the main part of the paper, focussing on the case where the worker is better oﬀ, the
worker’s utility is given by
uIA = u( ˜ w) − γc(a) − β [2 ˜ w − γc(a) − ER(a)].
Analogously to above consider the decision of a worker whether to work hard, i.e. choose
a2, or not. A worker will prefer to choose a2 over a1 if and only if
UIA (a2) ≥ UIA (a1)
u( ˜ w) − (1 − β)γc(a2) − β [2 ˜ w − ER(a2)] ≥ u(˜ w) − (1 − β)γc(a1) − β [2 ˜ w − ER(a1)]





Lemma 5 [Inequity Aversion (β)] There exists a positive value γ∗
IA such that a2 is
induced:


























($20 Wage) X Slowest -0.611***
(0.090)
(Hi Payoﬀ) X Slowest -0.597***
(0.078)
($20 Wage) X (Hi Payoﬀ) X Slowest 1.094***
(0.13)
($20 Wage) X Middle 0.217***
(0.077)
(Hi Payoﬀ) X Middle 0.295***
(0.087)
($20 Wage) X (Hi Payoﬀ) X Middle -0.0682
(0.12)
($20 Wage) X Fastest 0.0554
(0.093)
(Hi Payoﬀ) X Fastest 0.0507
(0.096)






Number of Subjects 186
Speciﬁcation includes heteroskedastic and panel level AR-1 errors. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Signiﬁcance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. Demographic dummies include
dummy variables for gender, race, age, work experience, and student status.
29Table 7: Eﬀects of Reciprocity with Speed Dummies
Coeﬃcients X Reciprocity
Slowest Third -0.432*** 0.425***
(0.091) (0.15)
Fastest Third -1.165*** -0.208
(0.12) (0.19)
($20 Wage) X Slowest -0.377*** -0.390**
(0.14) (0.19)
(Hi Payoﬀ) X Slowest -0.517*** -0.283
(0.097) (0.17)
($20 Wage) X (Hi Payoﬀ) X Slowest 0.900*** 0.440
(0.18) (0.27)
($20 Wage) X Middle -0.129 0.629***
(0.12) (0.15)
(High Payoﬀ) X Middle 0.281*** -0.569***
(0.099) (0.29)
($20 Wage) X (High Payoﬀ) X Middle 0.155 0.295
(0.16) (0.32)
($20 Wage) X Fastest -0.305** 0.828***
(0.12) (0.18)
(High Payoﬀ) X Fastest -0.387*** 0.978***
(0.13) (0.20)
($20 Wage) X (High Payoﬀ) X Fastest 0.335** -1.656***
(0.15) (0.25)






Number of Subjects 186
The ﬁrst column reports main eﬀects of treatment variables. The second column reports the coeﬃcients
for the interaction between the treatment variables and the reciprocity measure. The dummy for high
reciprocity denotes subjects whose (Max % Returned - Min % Returned) is at the 66th percentile or
higher. Speciﬁcation includes heteroskedastic and panel level AR-1 errors. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Signiﬁcance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. Demographic dummies
include dummy variables for gender, race, age, work experience, and student status.















Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
31Table 9: Eﬀect of Agreeableness with Speed Dummies
Coeﬃcients X Agreeable
Slowest Third -0.238*** -0.115
(0.085) (0.19)
Fastest Third 1.359*** -0.676***
(0.12) (0.20)
($20 Wage) X Slowest -0.700*** 1.027***
(0.095) (0.32)
(Hi Payoﬀ) X Slowest -0.313*** -0.521***
(0.093) (0.18)
($20 Wage) X (Hi Payoﬀ) X Slowest 0.925*** -0.549
(0.14) (0.39)
($20 Wage) X Middle 0.313*** -0.285
(0.094) (0.18)
(High Payoﬀ) X Middle 0.303*** -0.0842
(0.097) (0.26)
($20 Wage) X (High Payoﬀ) X Middle -0.156 0.250
(0.14) (0.30)
($20 Wage) X Fastest -0.240** 0.644***
(0.12) (0.19)
(High Payoﬀ) X Fastest -0.173 0.577***
(0.14) (0.20)
($20 Wage) X (High Payoﬀ) X Fastest -0.131 -0.177
(0.16) (0.24)






Number of Subjects 186
The ﬁrst column reports main eﬀects of treatment variables. The second column reports the coeﬃcients
for the interaction between the treatment variables and the reciprocity measure. The dummy for high
agreeableness denotes subjects whose agreeableness score is at the 75th percentile or higher. Speciﬁcation
includes heteroskedastic and panel level AR-1 errors. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. Demographic dummies include dummy
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